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I
In the 1990s, the Texas economy
exceeded even the remarkable perform-
ance of its U.S. counterpart. State job
growth averaged 2.9 percent per year from
1990 to 2000, well ahead of the 1.8 percent
annual increases in the United States.
Three engines drove the Texas economy
forward in the 1990s: the oil sector, high
tech (especially in Austin and Dallas) and
a boom in border-city employment.
Employment growth in the four largest
Texas border cities topped that of the
nation, and the three south Texas cities
outperformed the state by a wide margin
(Table 1).
1
The accelerated job growth along the
Texas–Mexico border was the result of
several factors: a quick Mexican recovery
after the 1994–95 financial crisis; tight
labor markets in the United States that
attracted employers to the border in
search of the region’s surplus labor; a
strong peso for much of the period, which
increased retail sales in U.S. border cities;
and rapid expansion of the maquiladora
industry. 
Maquiladora expansion came on the
heels of NAFTA implementation and the
1994–95 peso devaluation. In recent
years, however, this part of the border
boom has turned to bust. After watching
the industry lose 290,000 jobs between
October 2000 and July 2003, many
observers are questioning the industry’s
future. Recession, rising wages in Mexico,
low-wage competition from countries
such as China and Mexico’s inability to
deal with growing problems in its compet-
itive environment have all contributed to
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Table 1
Percent Job Growth Along the Texas–Mexico Border
Texas El Paso Laredo Brownsville McAllen
1991 .7 2.3 4.3 2.0 1.5
1992 1.9 3.6 8.7 4.8 5.3
1993 3.3 2.2 3.6 4.4 4.5
1994 4.3 3.9 7.2 6.0 7.3
1995 2.9 0 –5.5 .4 2.7
1996 3.2 2.0 5.1 2.8 3.3
1997 4.4 2.7 7.6 3.0 3.8
1998 3.6 1.1 2.7 2.3 5.6
1999 2.2 2.0 5.3 5.8 6.5
2000 2.8 1.5 3.0 5.1 5.1
1990–2000 2.9 2.1 4.1 3.7 4.6
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch, with data from the Texas Workforce Commission.
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the recent downturn.
This article looks at the maquiladora’s
role in today’s Texas economy, especially
how it affects Texas border cities. We also
assess the industry’s future and the
prospects for the maquiladora to again be
a significant factor in job growth in Texas
and Mexico. 
Growth and Decline
The maquiladora industry began in
1965 and experienced slow but steady
growth under the Border Industrialization
Program. The canceled Bracero Program
had used Mexican labor in agriculture,
and the replacement maquiladora was
designed to relieve the resulting high
unemployment rates in northern Mexico.
The new program used low-wage Mexican
labor as a lure to draw U.S. manufacturing
to the region, allowing companies to
move production machinery and
unassembled parts into Mexico without
tariff consequences, as long as the assem-
bled product was returned to the United
States for final sale.
Chart 1 shows the elevenfold increase
in maquiladora employment between
1980 and its peak in 2000, from 120,000
workers to 1.3 million. In 1980, about 94
percent of maquiladora employment was
in the border states of northern Mexico.
2
Today, the share has slipped to 76 percent,
but the northern states still dominate. In
2004, 2,810 operating plants accounted
for about 9 percent of formal employment
in Mexico, or 3 percent of the total labor
force. The companies operating under the
maquiladora program are a who’s who of
U.S. industry, including Delphi, Mattel,
Tyco, General Electric and ITT. 
The maquiladora industry has been
highly cyclical since its inception, falling
into its first recession in 1974 with an 11.5
percent decline in employment. Table 2
shows the uneven effects of the latest
maquiladora downturn on Mexican bor-
der cities. Maquiladora employment in
Ciudad Juárez was higher than in all the
other cities combined when the recession
began, and it has sustained the largest
percentage losses from peak to trough
(27.7 percent). Piedras Negras, Nuevo
Laredo and Matamoros also suffered large
percentage losses, all in excess of 24 per-
cent. Ciudad Acuña and Reynosa were
exceptions to the deep recession, with
Ciudad Acuña declining only 10.6 percent
and Reynosa continuing to grow through-
out the downturn. Newer plants, a better
industry mix and a business-friendly
environment account for their better per-
formance. 
The cyclical nature of the maquila-
dora industry is not surprising, given 
its close ties to U.S. manufacturing (Chart
2). Throughout the latest recession and
slow recovery, manufacturing was the
hardest hit part of the U.S. economy, and
maquiladora output and employment
generally followed the lead of U.S. indus-
trial production. In mid-2003, however,
strong U.S. industrial growth finally
returned, and as Table 2 shows, maqui-
ladora employment has returned to re-
covery as well. Job growth remains
uneven among the Mexican border cities,
however, with Ciudad Acuña, Matamoros
and Piedras Negras recovering more
slowly. 
How Do Maquladoras Affect the
Texas Border Economy? 
The original vision for maquiladoras
was the “twin plant,” with capital-inten-
sive operations located a few miles inside
the U.S. border and low-wage, labor-
intensive operations close by on the Mex-
ican side. However, the bulk of U.S. man-
ufacturing was already established in the
Midwest, and trucking deregulation
would make transportation links between
the border and the Midwest both easier
and cheaper in the 1970s and ’80s. The
twin-plant vision was never realized along
the border. Instead, the maquiladora sup-
ply chain remained concentrated in states
such as Illinois, Michigan and Ohio. 
What economic impact would a new
maquiladora in Mexico have on a neigh-
boring U.S. city? The list might run as fol-
lows. To select and develop a site, U.S.
legal, engineering and financial assistance
would be used. Once established, the new
plant would rely on U.S.-based businesses
for customs, brokerage, warehousing and
transportation services. The plant would
also purchase a variety of office, packag-
ing and industrial supplies. Corporate
management, engineers and quality spe-
Chart 1
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Table 2
Texas–Mexico Maquiladora Border Employment
Peak Trough
Jobs Date Jobs Date April 2005
Ciudad Juárez 262,550 October 2000 189,930 June 2003 213,389
Ciudad Acuña 37,512 November 2002 33,541 February 2005 33,674
Piedras Negras 15,222 February 2000 10,939 December 2004 11,187
Nuevo Laredo 22,915 February 2000 17,171 April 2003 22,233
Reynosa 86,925 April 2005 N/A N/A N/A
Matamoros 68,413 October 2000 51,900 August 2003 53,002
NOTES: Seasonally adjusted data; border twin cities are as follows: Ciudad Juárez–El Paso, Ciudad Acuña–Del Rio, Piedras Negras–Eagle
Pass, Nuevo Laredo–Laredo, Reynosa–McAllen and Matamoros–Brownsville.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch, with data from INEGI.29 OCTOBER 2005 | FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
research suggests that U.S. border
states—with the exception of Arizona,
where job losses ranged from negligible to
small—gained jobs as a result of growth in
the maquiladora industry.
8
A more recent development has been
the arrival of component parts and mate-
rial suppliers in U.S. border cities. Specific
examples can be found in El Paso, neigh-
bor to Ciudad Juárez, which is home to the
largest number of maquiladora employ-
ees along the U.S. border. Over the past
decade, an increasing number of rubber
and plastics, electronics and electrical
equipment, and metal fabricating plants
have begun to operate in El Paso to serve
as suppliers to the maquiladora industry
(Chart 3). 
Components supplied include com-
puter housings, electrical wiring har-
nesses, special dies and tools, and electri-
cal switches. About 26 plastic-injection
molding plants can be identified, 31 metal
stamping companies, and 12 electric- and
electronic-related companies. Together,
these companies employed 4,000 workers
in 2004. The manufacturing sectors that
supply the maquiladoras paid about 40
percent more in hourly wages than the
low-wage apparel, textile and leather in-
dustries that traditionally operated in 
El Paso. 
Maquila manufacturing in Mexico
also positively influences El Paso’s
employment in transportation, real
estate, and legal and accounting services
(Chart 4). Given the rapid increase in
trade flows after 1993, transportation and
warehousing employment accelerated
quickly. Business service employment,
especially personnel supply services,
computer programming and data pro-
cessing, grew 45 percent from 1990 to
2004. El Paso’s maquiladora-related busi-
nesses rely heavily on temporary staffing
agencies to hire additional personnel to
meet rising demand. Computer program-
ming and data service workers help mini-
mize the burden of paperwork required by
customs agencies to export or import
components. Legal employment grew 20
percent over the same period. Similar
results can be found up and down the U.S.
border. 
The definitive study on the linkages
between maquiladoras and the border
economy, by Gordon Hanson, takes all
these factors into account.
9 Hanson esti-
mates that a 10 percent increase in
maquiladora output in a Mexican border
city will increase employment in its U.S.
city pair by 1.1 to 2 percent. He provides
more specifics by estimating that this
same 10 percent increase in output would
increase wholesale trade employment in
the U.S. city by 2.1 to 2.7 percent, trans-
portation services by 1.7 to 2.7 percent,
manufacturing by 1.2 to 2.1 percent and
retail trade by 1 to 1.8 percent.
The Role of Recession
The recent recession has played an
important role in the latest downturn of
the highly cyclical maquiladora industry.
At the same time, maquiladoras have long
served as a low-wage platform for U.S.
cialists would be drawn to the border to
visit this plant, and they would spend
money on food and lodging.
3Maquiladora
employees draw their salary in Mexico but
do a significant share of their shopping in
the United States, stimulating employ-
ment in local retail and service sectors. 
These impacts on the U.S. border
have been recognized for some time, and
a number of studies were conducted in
the 1970s and ’80s to quantify them. For
instance, in 1972, Ladman and Poulsen
found that Agua Prieta, Sonora, maquila-
dora workers spent 40 percent of their
wages in Arizona.
4 Ayer and Layton esti-
mated the maquiladoras’ impact on value
added and population, using an input–
output model for the Arizona–Mexico
border economy. They concluded that
Mexicans’ expenditures due to the growing
presence of twin plants increased value
added by 14 percent and population by 11
percent on the U.S. side of the border.
5
In a 1984 study of the Texas border,
Holden estimated that maquiladora
employment had a large impact on
employment in the border communities
of El Paso, Laredo, McAllen and Browns-
ville. For instance, a 10 percent increase in
maquiladora payroll results in a 2 to 3 per-
cent increase in employment in El Paso
and McAllen as well as a 3 to 4 percent
increase in Laredo and Brownsville.
6
In another study, Sprinkle found that
during the early 1980s Ciudad Juárez
maquiladoras accounted for one of five
jobs created in El Paso, and these new jobs
were concentrated in the service sector.
7
Silvers and Pavlakovich assessed the rela-
tive magnitude of employment gains and
losses across U.S. border regions due to
maquiladora industry activity. Their
Chart 2
Maquiladora Ties to 
U.S. Industrial Sector
Index, January 2000 = 100, seasonally adjusted
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch, with data
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manufacturing, and the rise of new low-
wage alternatives such as China, India
and Vietnam has broadened U.S. options
for manufacturing. These very low-wage
competitors, plus rising real Mexican
wages, have become a factor in pushing
some maquiladora activity abroad. Mex-
ico generally has looked at the loss of the
lowest wage jobs as an inevitable price of
progress, because increasing domestic
wage levels must be seen as a positive
aspect of economic development. The
government has expressed reluctance to
enter into subsidy programs to retain or
attract these industries, considering such
action as poor fiscal policy and a violation
of Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development and World Trade
Organization rules. 
To focus on the question of how
maquiladoras will respond to economic
recovery and which sectors would 
benefit, we developed some econometric
estimates. As in other models, our
methodology confirmed that past maqui-
ladora employment has primarily been
driven by the business cycle and relative
real wages.
10 Trends and dummy shift
variables were included to account for
structural change, particularly testing for
breaks with the 1994 implementation of
NAFTA and the 1994–95 financial crisis in
Mexico. The general methodology follows
several papers by Branson and Love, and
detailed results are reported elsewhere.
11
To examine the future of the industry
under various assumptions, we simulated
maquiladora employment following its
second quarter 2000 peak. The base case
was the actual outcome through 2002, a
decline of 14.5 percent for the industry as
a whole. Scenario 1 (S1) assumed no
recession and that the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate held firm at a historically low 4
percent through the end of the period.
Real relative wages rose in this scenario,
just as in the base case. Scenario 2 (S2)
assumed the recession occurred but that
real relative maquiladora wages fell 6.1
percent after second quarter 2000 instead
of rising 16.8 percent. And scenario 3 (S3)
assumed the best of both worlds for
maquiladora managers, falling real rela-
tive wages and no recession.
Chart 5 shows the results for all
maquiladoras combined. This can be
computed two ways: as the result of a sin-
gle estimate based on the sum of all
maquiladora employment or as the sum
of the simulation results for 10 maqui-
ladora sectors. Fortunately, they agree
quite closely. Eliminating the U.S. reces-
sion in S1 would provide an increase of
approximately 20 percent in employment
in the simulation period, replacing a
decline of about 14.5 percent in the base
case. The percentage turnaround for S2 is
similar, and the combined effect in S3 is a
31 percent increase. 
Four individual sectors do not
Chart 5
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respond to an upturn in the U.S. econ-
omy: leather, toys, furniture and a group
of other, unclassified maquiladoras. Their
simulation results are summarized in
Table 3. Combined, these maquiladoras
accounted for 226,782 jobs at the second
quarter 2000 peak, or 18.1 percent of the
total. These sectors are unlikely to return
to growth with U.S. economic recovery. 
The three largest maquiladora sec-
tors, together accounting for 76.1 percent
of the peak employment, all respond pos-
itively to economic recovery in the simu-
lations. In S1, electrical machinery
records an 18.2 percent increase, in place
of a 26.1 percent decline. Textiles turn
around to record a 63.2 percent gain in S1,
and transportation equipment (which did
not decline after second quarter 2000)
grows by another 4.5 percent in this sce-
nario.
In conclusion, less than 20 percent of
maquiladora employment is in sectors
that are unresponsive to economic recov-
ery in the United States, and overall
growth seems likely to continue. However,
even those sectors that continue to grow
in simulations are going to be influenced
by foreign competition. The effect of for-
eign competition is often couched in
terms of a product cycle, in which product
development and testing occur in the
United States, initial long production runs
take place in Mexico and ultimately prod-
uct commoditization happens in China or
another low-wage competitor. The more
quickly and easily a product is commodi-
tized, the quicker it will move to China.
Leather, toy and furniture sectors are
often cited as no longer competitive in
Mexico. But even within the most
advanced sectors, we may find individual
products susceptible to being lost to lower
wage countries in exactly the same way—
computers, cell phones, modems, print-
ers and disk drives, for example. Hence,
the rise of foreign competition means
even sectors returning to positive growth
with economic recovery may experience
slower job growth than in the recent past,
as some products within the sector are
commoditized. 
In assessing Mexico’s competitive
prospects, the nation retains crucial
advantages over the rest of the world,
even as domestic wages rise. The most
important factor is proximity to the U.S.
market. For example, bulky items that
have a high ratio of weight to value, such
as large-screen televisions or major appli-
ances, will remain competitive. Proximity
also matters if the inventory cycle is short,
if there are constant design changes or if
there must be frequent retooling. Mexico
will also be competitive when quality is
more important than price, such as with
medical equipment or when intellectual
property rights are critical.
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Texas-Based Suppliers
The maquiladoras’ contribution to
U.S. border city growth in the 1990s
stemmed from (1) the spillovers from
rapid maquiladora expansion in neigh-
boring Mexican cities and (2) the shift of
many maquiladora suppliers to border
cities from their base in the Midwest. We
have already shown how foreign competi-
tion and rising real wages in Mexico have
reduced the prospects for maquiladora
growth, but foreign competition is also
making significant inroads into the
maquiladora supply chain. This raises the
possibility of slowing, or even reversing,
the increase of U.S. border-city suppliers
to the maquiladora industry. 
Throughout the 1990s, the United
States supplied the vast majority of
maquiladora industry inputs. In 2000, 90
percent of maquiladora inputs were from
the United States and 9 percent were from
Asia, with China contributing only 1 per-
cent (Chart 6). By 2004, 59 percent came
from the United States and 35.7 percent
from Asia, including 11.1 percent from
China. The United States remains the
majority supplier, but this rapidly moving
trend continued to run in favor of Asia
into 2005. 
The vehicle for entry of foreign inputs
to Mexico is 20 sectoral promotion pro-
grams, or PROSECs, created by the Mexi-
can government in December 2000. They
were created in response to implementa-
tion of NAFTA Article 303, which in Janu-
ary 2001 eliminated duty-free imports of
maquiladora inputs from non-NAFTA
countries. The PROSECs protect the entry
to Mexico of non-NAFTA components
that are not readily available in the
domestic market, allowing them to enter
under reduced tariffs of zero to 5 percent.
Despite the paperwork and the need to
track the origin of thousands of parts to
comply with PROSECs, maquiladoras
have apparently fully embraced the pro-
grams.
Data are not available on exactly
which inputs are being displaced, making
it difficult to assess the impact on Texas
border communities. For example, if the
1990s shift of suppliers to the border from
the Midwest was based on just-in-time
inventory needs, it may be difficult for
Asian suppliers to take their place. How-
ever, given the extent and pace at which
Table 3
Maquiladora Sectors That Are Unresponsive
to a U.S. Economic Rebound
(Percent change in jobs)
Not
Leather Toys Furniture classified
Base –25.6 –31.5 –8.7 –4.9
S1 –7.8 –21.0 –8.9 –2.1
S2 –6.8 –34.7 17.3 –22.1
S3 –7.4 –5.1 4.4 5.8
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Asian suppliers have taken market share,
it would be hard to argue that the
maquiladora market share of Texas-based
suppliers has not been reduced. Future
expansion of Texas-based suppliers is
likely to slow as well.
Conclusion
Mexico’s maquiladora jobs are grow-
ing once more, beginning with the
resumption of U.S. industrial expansion
in mid-2003. Mexico retains important
competitive advantages over many of its
low-wage rivals, based on proximity to the
United States, political and financial sta-
bility, and the rule of law. The maqui-
ladora industry is stable, competitive and
growing again. 
It is unlikely, however, to repeat the
banner performance of the 1990s, at least
not in the near future. There were ele-
ments of unique, one-time stimulus in the
1990s, with the collapse of the peso in
1994–95 and the implementation of
NAFTA in 1994. Further, foreign competi-
tion appears to have taken away the
potential for any growth in several low-
wage sectors and probably has reduced
the growth potential of a number of other
sectors as well. 
Rising real wages in Mexico have
accelerated the transfer of low-wage jobs
to other countries, and the Mexican gov-
ernment has argued that this must be
seen as a highly desirable result of suc-
cessful economic development and Mex-
ico’s move up the product cycle. The next
generation of maquiladoras should not be
judged by the ability to generate low-wage
jobs, but by productivity, value added or
rising wages. Critics, at the same time,
claim Mexico simply has not done an ade-
quate job of preparing the way for more
sophisticated manufacturing. To illustrate
this point, many observers cite the failure
(so far) of proposed reforms in energy,
labor law, taxes and telecommunications.
These and other reforms are badly needed
to prepare Mexico for a fine market econ-
omy. 
Finally, it is not just the maquiladora
industry that is affected by foreign com-
petition, but the U.S.-based supply chain
as well. In 2000, 90 percent of inputs to the
maquiladoras came from the United
States, and four years later that number
was only 59 percent. Texas border cities in
the 1990s developed rapidly as a critical,
new part of this supply chain, with suppli-
ers shifting from the Midwest to the
U.S.–Mexico border. We lack industry
detail to know exactly how the recent suc-
cess of foreign suppliers is affecting Texas
border cities, but again, declining eco-
nomic stimulus from maquiladora expan-
sion would seem to be the rule.
Cañas and Coronado are assistant
economists at the El Paso Branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Gilmer is a
vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
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